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ABSTRACT 
 Virginia’s conditional zoning law allows a landowner to voluntarily 
agree to limit the use of property in certain ways or otherwise to perform 
certain acts, including in some cases the provision of cash or other services, 
as conditions in support of certain land use permits or authorizations. While 
established with laudable purpose, that system of conditional zoning (com-
monly known as the “proffer system” referencing the promises “proffered” 
to localities) has, in certain instances, been used by localities in a manner 
that more closely resembles forced exactions than voluntary conditions. In 
2016, the Virginia General Assembly enacted legislation reforming these ar-
rangements in an effort to return efficiency and fairness to the process. This 
Article summarizes the history of proffers in Virginia, describes certain judi-
cial interpretations and modifications of proffer laws and practices, and an-
alyzes the 2016 reforms enacted by the General Assembly – concluding that, 
once implemented, the 2016 law will improve conditions for landowners and 
homeowners in Virginia. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 2016, legislation enacted during the 2016 Session of the Vir-
ginia General Assembly representing a fundamental restructuring of Vir-
ginia’s system of conditional zoning became applicable to the Common-
wealth’s localities. Pursuant to that system, localities may accept voluntary 
offers by applicants to limit or qualify how a subject property will be used or 
developed or otherwise to perform certain acts or provide cash or other ser-
vices (“proffers”) as conditions on a property in exchange for the approval of 
a rezoning application.1 In spite of a laudable original intent and the early 
support of the development community, the proffer system has been the sub-
ject of regular criticism and legislative modification in recent years as certain 
localities across the Commonwealth have become more and more reliant on 
the system as a salve for impacts arguably not directly (or even indirectly) 
caused by the relevant development.2   
The 2016 legislation, enacted as Chapter 322 of the 2016 Acts of Assem-
bly (the “Proffer Reform Act” or the “Act”) and codified as § 15.2-2303.4 of 
                                                 
1 Commission on Local Government Commonwealth of Virginia, Report on Proffered Cash Payments and 
Expenditures by Virginia’s Counties, Cities and Towns 2015-2016 (2016). 
2 Antonio Olivio, Va. Bills Seek to Weaken Land-use Tool Behind New Roads, Parks, and Schools, Wash. 
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the Code of Virginia (the “Statute”), was promoted by the building industry 
as a means of restoring a modicum of reason and fairness to a process that 
had, in the eyes of its proponents, morphed in some localities from a system 
of voluntary mitigation to one of forced exaction.3 At its core, the Act sub-
stantially limits the permissible breadth of certain proffers and provides ap-
plicants with a remedy to address infractions by the government. 
Following a brief discussion regarding Virginia’s proffer system, includ-
ing its origins and certain recent revisions occasioned by perceived liberties 
taken by localities, this article provides a detailed analysis of the 2016 Proffer 
Reform Act and its expected impact on Virginia’s system of conditional zon-
ing. 
I. VIRGINIA’S PROFFER SYSTEM 
A. In Concept 
In many respects, the purpose of the Proffer Reform Act was to return 
Virginia’s concept of conditional zoning and the proffer process back in the 
direction of its roots. 
By black letter law, Virginia defines “conditional zoning” as meaning, “as 
part of classifying land within a locality into areas and districts by legislative 
action, the allowing of reasonable conditions governing the use of such prop-
erty, such conditions being in addition to, or modification of the regulations 
provided for a particular zoning district or zone by the overall zoning ordi-
nance.”4 The statutory purpose of conditional zoning is to establish “a more 
flexible and adaptable zoning method to cope with situations found in such 
zones […] whereby a zoning reclassification may be allowed subject to cer-
tain conditions proffered by the […] applicant for the protection of the com-
munity that are not generally applicable to land similarly zoned.”5   
With these two policy pronouncements, the Code of Virginia supplies 
helpful insight into the original intent and purpose underlying Virginia’s 
proffer system – to provide a legally binding (legislative) method by which 
an applicant may add to the requirements of, or modify her rights under, an 
existing zoning classification in a manner not generally applicable to land in 
the zone both to provide for the protection of the community and as means 
for gaining government approval for a rezoning.   
                                                 
3 See id. 
4 Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2201 (2016) (emphasis added). 
5 Id. at § 15.2-2296 (emphasis added). 
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It is noteworthy both that the definition contemplates conditions as addi-
tions to, or modifications of, the regulations of a particular zone and that the 
purpose statement contemplates the conditions as applicable to land. Notice-
ably absent from this concept, of course, is any allusion to the conditions as 
satisfaction of local expectations for cash (or anything else) to be used for the 
more general benefit of the local citizenry as an alternative to taxes. While 
such expectations have become common practice in recent years (as dis-
cussed infra, “rough proportionality” can be quite rough in practice), the con-
cepts set forth in §§ 15.2-2201 and 15.2-2296 of the Code reflect both the 
early days of the proffer system as well as the conceptual baseline toward 
which the Statute hopes to return the modern system. 
B. Early History6 
Under its early conceptualization, the proffer system was the codification 
of an applicant practice that had originated in Fairfax County of including 
“development conditions,” either in a development plan (required pursuant 
to certain early “Planned Development” zoning categories) or as part of a 
plan of development in a rezoning application, as a means of overcoming 
concerns with the development raised by neighbors, county staff, planning 
commissioners, or members of the Board of Supervisors.7 These early condi-
tions often included height restrictions, setback increases, the creation of a 
buffer in commercial settings, or limits on density or the provision of a school 
in the residential setting.8 The difficulty with this early practice was that it 
was not legally binding on the developer or its successors and, as such, was 
not as effective at assuaging local concerns as it could be and was subject to 
challenge as contracting away legislative authority.9  
In 1973, apparently driven by these concerns, the General Assembly 
passed a bill:  
[To allow] for the adoption, in [Fairfax County] as a part of an amendment to the 
zoning map of reasonable conditions, in addition to the regulations provided for 
the zoning district by ordinance, when such conditions shall have been proffered 
in writing […] by the owner of the property which is the subject of the proposed 
                                                 
6 The authors wish to thank principals of the land use bar and development community during this period 
including William G. Thomas, Grayson P. Hanes, John T. “Til” Hazel, and Douglas R. Fahl for invaluable 
background regarding the early history of the Virginia proffer system. Certain historical observations were 
supported by the unpublished work of Doug Fahl. See, Douglas R. Fahl, Proffer Reform (Sb 549) – Why 
It Is Necessary 1 (2016), http://www.hbav.com/site/publisher/files/Proffer%20Reform% 
20Why%20Needed%205August2016_pdf%20Doug%20Fahl%202016.pdf. 
7 See Fahl, supra note 6. 
8 Id. at 2. 
9 Id. 
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zoning map amendment.10   
This initial Virginia proffer statute solved an immediate problem for Fair-
fax County and its development community by allowing a developer to enter 
a legally binding agreement with the locality to limit a landowner’s rights or 
provide relief from an impact caused by proposed development in order to 
assuage the concerns of interested parties. And as originally contemplated, 
the system was reasonably unobjectionable. The difficulty for certain mem-
bers of the development community came with what followed. 
The original proffer statute (what has become § 15.2-2303) applied ini-
tially to Fairfax County, with its Urban County Executive form of govern-
ment, and later to adjacent jurisdictions including Prince William and 
Loudoun Counties and two counties east of the Chesapeake Bay. Throughout 
the later 1970’s and 80’s, the General Assembly enacted a multitude of addi-
tional provisions expanding upon (and in some cases restricting) the power 
of localities to accept proffers.11   
In 1978, the General Assembly expanded proffer authority to all Virginia 
localities (and, perhaps sensing the possibility of abuse, also added the state-
ment of purpose now set forth in § 15.2-2296).12 In what is now § 15.2-2297 
of the Code, the General Assembly authorized localities to accept a voluntary 
proffer by a landowner of conditions as part of a rezoning provided: (i) the 
rezoning itself must give rise for the need for the conditions; (ii) the condi-
tions must have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; (iii) the conditions do 
not include a cash contribution to the locality; (iv) the conditions do not in-
clude mandatory dedication of real or personal property for open space, 
parks, schools, fire departments or other public facilities not otherwise pro-
vided in § 15.2-2241; (v) the conditions do not include payment for or con-
struction of off-site improvements except as provided for in § 15.2-2241; (vi) 
a condition may not be proffered that is not related to the physical develop-
ment or physical condition of the property; and (vii) all conditions must be 
in conformity with the comprehensive plan.13 While quite restrictive in the-
ory, the word “voluntary” – included no doubt to provide a theoretical dis-
tinction from a forced exaction – provides a roadmap for circumvention that, 
                                                 
10 1973 Va. Acts 379. 
11 Virginia adheres to Dillon Rule principles whereby a unit of local government has only those powers 
granted by the General Assembly and those necessarily implied from such a grant. See Bd. of Zoning 
Appeals of Fairfax Cty. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Cty., 666 S.E.2d. 315, 317 (2008). Under such 
principles, unless the General Assembly grants power to a unit of local government, the locality does not 
have the ability to exercise such authority. 
12 1978 Va. Acts 320. 
13 Va. Code. Ann. § 15.2-2297 (2016). 
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by anecdote, has been frequently exploited over time.14   
It is helpful to see, however, that in this first real expansion of proffering 
authority, the General Assembly was sufficiently concerned with potential 
abuse that it disallowed both cash contributions and other benefits that are 
not specifically tied to the impacts of the development (e.g., dedication of 
open space and parks or construction of certain off-site improvements) and 
specifically prohibited any condition that is not related to the physical devel-
opment or physical condition of the property. 
While the early concept was a relatively conservative one, it became lib-
eralized with time. In 1989, the General Assembly further expanded the 
breadth of conditional zoning authority when what is now § 15.2-2298 of the 
Code was enacted for high-growth localities.15 The expanded proffer author-
ity provided for voluntary proffering of reasonable conditions so long as: “(i) 
the rezoning itself gives rise to the need for the conditions; (ii) the conditions 
have a reasonable relation to the rezoning; and (iii) all conditions are in con-
formity with the comprehensive plan.”16 These revisions expanded authority 
for high growth localities to accept significantly more flexible proffers – in-
cluding cash. 
C. Modern Uses (and Abuses) and the Futility of Legal Challenge 
As land development activity increased, localities have increasingly 
sought to offset general impacts upon government facilities such as schools, 
parks, roads and utilities by increased demands for payment of cash proffers. 
Whereas in early stages of land use case law, local governments and rezoning 
applicants often cooperatively worked out conditions that were reasonably-
related to the impact of a particular project, as development activity increased 
(and the political will to enact broad-based revenue measures decreased), the 
conceptually “reasonable relationship” of conditions to the rezoning project 
often, in the give and take of negotiation, became a locality’s wish list oppor-
tunity to ask for conditions (bordering on exactions) that could have been 
                                                 
14 According to land use practitioners, localities often seek and obtain a wide variety of proffers that might 
appear to conflict with statutory requirements because proffers are made “voluntarily” by an applicant at 
the time of the legislative body’s public hearing. Once the rezoning is approved, the rezoning applicant 
may be estopped from challenging a proffer because it was “voluntarily” offered. See A. Barton Hinkle, 
Are Proffers Built on Shaky Ground?, Richmond Times Dispatch (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.rich-
mond.com/are-proffers-built-on-shaky-ground/article_e04c6be8-7b39-5292-99cb-f35e97c25de3.html. 
15 1989 Va. Acts 697 (current version at Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2298 (2017)). 
16 Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2298 (2017). These modern concepts roughly reflect constitutional mandates of 
reasonable relationships and rough proportionality between conditions and disturbance. However, some 
localities have found ample room for expansive reading within the statutory and constitutional mandates 
over time. See infra p. 7. 
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characterized in some circumstances as “an out-and-out plan of extortion.”17   
With time, these “wish lists” have grown long. During modern Virginia 
rezoning review, it has become common practice for some localities to rec-
ommend denial of a rezoning application unless the applicant proffers obli-
gations such as cash payments for the unmet housing needs of the locality, 
county-wide open space easement requirements, design details of units, af-
fordable housing fees unrelated to project density, regional water quality im-
provements unrelated to a particular project, regional transit fees, and re-
gional road fees, among others.   
Such expansive proffering is perhaps most apparent in the area of cash – 
where localities have, for years, published “schedules” noting per lot “expec-
tations” for cash proffers. Specifically, and notwithstanding constitutional 
hash marks concerning exaction obligations,18 rezoning applicants have been 
expected to “voluntarily” pay regularly-increasing fees set by localities to 
address what might be considered locality-wide public facility needs (contra 
simply those specifically created by the proposed development). Examples 
of cash proffers expected to be paid before the Act became effective include 
the following recommended cash fees for a single family detached home: 
Loudoun County ($45,923), Prince William County ($44,930), Spotsylvania 
County ($33,285); Chesterfield County ($18,966), etc.   
Importantly, these proffer schedules were uniform across their respective 
localities – and were completely unrelated to the actual impact of a specific 
development on public facilities. If existing facilities had capacity, for exam-
ple, the actual impact could be quite low and, thus, a high proffer payment 
would be in excess of compensating for the impact. “Roughly proportional,” 
perhaps, but not necessarily consistent with the original concept of the sys-
tem.19 Often, the costs of these proffer payments were passed on to new home 
buyers, thereby increasing the cost of new housing for which a rezoning was 
required in a manner not shared by buyers of existing homes or by-right de-
velopment. 
While there have been challenges to such “expected” proffers, they are 
few (it may be politically difficult for a developer to sue a locality) and face 
substantial hurdles under current case law. A good description of an expected 
cash proffer may be found in Board of Supervisors of Powhatan County v. 
Reed’s Landing Corp., 250 Va. 397 (1995). In this case the Powhatan County 
Board of Supervisors would not approve a rezoning application for the sole 
                                                 
17 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
18 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
19 Note that the inverse could also be true – where the actual impact of a development could exceed the 
uniform cash proffer amount. 
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reason that the developer refused to pay a $2,439.00 per lot proffer. The Su-
preme Court concluded that, under Dillon Rule principles, local governing 
bodies have only the powers the General Assembly expressly or by necessary 
implication confers upon them that did not include imposition of an impact 
fee.20 Evaluating proffer legislative authority the Supreme Court determined 
a unit of local government “is not empowered to require a specified proffer 
as a condition precedent to a rezoning.”21     
The sort of “expected” cash proffer determined in Reed’s Landing to have 
been an ultra vires request, has nevertheless been distinguished by the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court in factual patterns such as is stated in Gregory v. Board 
of Supervisors of Chesterfield County.22 In Gregory, the Board of Supervisors 
denied a rezoning application where the record established “[p]ersuasive ev-
idence exists that full cash proffers or lack thereof played a key factor in the 
Board[’s] determination.”23 In Gregory the Supreme Court distinguished 
Reed’s Landing, noting while there was evidence from which to conclude 
that the County “expected” cash proffers, “the evidence is not as ‘definitive’ 
as the evidence presented in [Reed’s Landing.]”24 The distinguishing factor 
in Gregory, unlike Reed’s Landing, was the record the county established to 
demonstrate that where there are two reasonable zoning classifications for 
the property, the Board was free to choose between the two classifications. 
The fairly debatable standard set forth in Gregory is routinely utilized by 
localities to deny a requested rezoning, even if the record shows “persuasive 
evidence” that the absence of an offer to pay maximum cash proffers “played 
a key factor” and that cash proffers were “expected,” as they were in Reed’s 
Landing.25 
D. Recent Legislative Reactions 
In response to consistently increasing liberties taken with the confines of 
the proffer statutes, the General Assembly has sought, in recent years, to 
reign in certain symptoms of abuse. For example, the General Assembly has 
addressed issues concerning when cash proffers may be collected or accepted 
(§ 15.2-2303.1:1), the timing of expenditures and use of cash payments 
(§ 15.2-2303.2), and the timing of payment of a cash proffer prior to issuance 
of a building permit (§ 15.2-2303.3), among many other issues. Indeed, most 
sessions of the General Assembly since 2000 have included some iteration of 
                                                 
20 Bd. of Supervisors of Powhatan Cty. v. Reed’s Landing Corp., 463 S.E.2d 668 (Va. 1995). 
21 Id. at 670. 
22 Gregory v. Bd. of Supervisors of Chesterfield Cty., 514 S.E.2d 350 (Va. 1999). 
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“proffer reform.”26 
The General Assembly’s interest in reform has, at times, been spurred by 
developments in federal law. In the summer of 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court 
made an important ruling related to the Nollan/Dolan constitutional standard 
in Koontz vs. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist. (“Koontz”).27 Importantly, 
while Nollan and Dolan dealt with the dedication of interests in real property 
(e.g., easements), the Court in Koontz found that “the government’s demand 
for property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the requirements 
of Nollan and Dolan even when the government denies the permit and even 
when its demand is for money.”28 
Thus, in Koontz, the Court plowed new ground in two key respects: (1) a 
proposed permit condition may be found to be an unconstitutional condition 
not simply “when the government approves a development permit condi-
tioned on the owner’s conveyance of a property interest (i.e., imposes a con-
dition subsequent), but also when the government denies a permit until the 
owner meets the condition (i.e., imposes a condition precedent);”29 and (2) 
the Nollan/Dolan requirements apply to monetary exactions (e.g., cash prof-
fers) in addition to other types of non-cash exactions. On the latter point, the 
5-4 majority found that if the Nollan/Dolan standard was not applicable to 
monetary exactions, it would be “very easy for land-use permitting officials 
to evade” the rule through use of “so-called ‘in lieu of’ fees” – fees that the 
majority found to be “functionally equivalent to other types of land use ex-
actions.”30 For that reason, the Court held, “‘monetary exactions’ must satisfy 
the nexus and rough proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.”31 
Importantly, the applicant in Koontz was able to seek relief in the Florida 
state courts under a state statute authorizing damages and attorney fees for 
victims of unconstitutional exactions and, at the time, Virginia did not have 
a similar statute. Thus, a Virginia applicant in a similar circumstance may not 
have had the same avenue of opportunity to enjoy the protections afforded 
by Nollan/Dolan and Koontz. 
To provide a clear avenue for Virginia landowners to seek relief in Vir-
ginia state court under Nollan/Dolan/Koontz, the 2014 General Assembly 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., 2008 Va. Acts 733; 2006 Va. Acts 450; 2001 Va. Acts 703. 
27 See generally Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013) (requiring 
land use exactions and permit conditions to be both closely related and proportional to the impact of the 
proposed land use, lest the exaction/condition be considered a “taking” for which the applicant may be 
owed compensation).  
28 Id. at 2603 (Kagan, E., dissenting). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 2599 (majority opinion). 
31 Id.   
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passed a new provision of the Code to afford a state law remedy to Virginia 
applicants aggrieved by the imposition of unconstitutional conditions.32 
While the clear goal of the legislation was not only to provide applicants a 
clear state court remedy, but more broadly to encourage localities to stay 
within the parameters of Nollan/Dolan when considering local land use de-
cisions, it was limited in its ability to effect real change in the proffer system. 
Specifically, because the Koontz legislation defaulted to the constitutional 
standards of rough proportionality and rational nexus, it could stem only the 
most egregious abuses by local governments (presuming an applicant was 
willing to enforce her rights) and left ample room for local excesses within 
the confines of the constitutional mandates.   
To the sponsors of the Proffer Reform Act, additional reform was required. 
II. THE PROFFER REFORM ACT OF 2016 
The Proffer Reform Act was promoted by the building industry to push 
the modern proffer process back toward its original conceptions, inter alia, 
by requiring that proffers be tied closer to the actual impact of the develop-
ment than might be required by existing statutes or constitutional baselines 
and to give renewed meaning to the concept of the “voluntary” proffer (con-
tra “the required exaction”).33 
As signed by the Governor, the Act accomplishes three fundamental ob-
jectives: (1) it provides a new standard for adjudging the permissibility of a 
particular type of condition (proffers) that may be accepted by a locality in 
the context of a certain subset of residential rezoning or proffer condition 
amendment (“PCA”) applications;34 (2) it prohibits localities from either re-
questing or accepting an impermissible (or “unreasonable” as used in the Act) 
proffer in conjunction with a rezoning or PCA or otherwise from denying a 
rezoning or PCA application on the basis of the applicant’s refusal or failure 
to submit such an unreasonable proffer;35 (3) it provides a legal remedy 
whereby certain aggrieved parties may enjoy relief for violations of the Act 
and, thereby, enforce rights protected therein.36  
Although it is too early to judge the full implication of the Act, a brief 
analysis of its key provisions may provide insight regarding its expected im-
pact on Virginia’s proffer system in the future.   
                                                 
32 See 2014 Va. Acts 1140; 2014 Va. Acts 1255. 
33 Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2303.4(C) (2016). 
34 Id. at § 15.2-2303.4(B). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at § 15.2-2303.4(D). 
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A. Definitions 
 Subsection A of the Act provides definitions for various terms used in 
the section and, thereby, provides substantive limitations on the Act’s reach.   
 While the definitions should be reviewed carefully in their entirety, 
key limitations found in subsection A limit the scope of the Act to residential 
development and use (including residential components of mixed use devel-
opment), distinguish between onsite and offsite proffers (offsite proffers in-
cluding, by definition, all cash proffers), and define public facility improve-
ment (effectively public transportation/road improvements, public safety 
improvements, public school improvements, and public parks) for purposes 
of later limitations on offsite proffers.37 
B. Prohibitions 
Subsection B of the Act contains the Act’s two key prohibitions on local-
ities. As noted above, this section prohibits localities from (i) requesting or 
accepting an “unreasonable” (as defined in subsection C) proffer in the con-
text of a residential rezoning or PCA; or (ii) denying a rezoning or PCA ap-
plication where such denial is based (in whole or in part) upon an applicant’s 
failure or refusal to submit an unreasonable proffer in connection with the 
application.38 
In the first part, a locality is specifically precluded not only from request-
ing (or encouraging, etc.) an applicant to submit an unreasonable proffer but, 
importantly, from accepting an unreasonable proffer submitted “voluntarily” 
by the applicant. The concept of prohibiting acceptance of an impermissible 
proffer mirrors, inter alia, Va. Code § 15.2-2303.1:1 (a statute that limits 
when certain cash proffers may be accepted by a locality) and is designed to 
forestall subtle coaxing by the locality that might otherwise attend “volun-
tary” proffers. As the onus for the prohibition is on the locality (contra the 
profferor), it is the locality that violates the statute for the acceptance of an 
impermissible proffer.39 
In the second part, a locality is precluded from denying a relevant applica-
tion on the basis of the applicant’s refusal to submit an unreasonable proffer. 
This provision raises obvious questions of proof and is drafted to work 
closely in tandem with subdivision D(2) which provides a presumption re-
                                                 
37 Id. at § 15.2-2303.4(A). 
38 Va .Code Ann. § 15.2-2303.4(B) (2016). 
39 Id. 
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lated to the denial of a rezoning or PCA application on an impermissible ba-
sis. 
C. “Unreasonable” Proffers 
Subsection C of the Act defines what it means to be an “unreasonable” 
proffer for purposes of the Act’s prohibitions and remedies. Importantly, this 
definition varies depending on whether the proffer in question is an “onsite” 
or an “offsite” proffer – with greater latitude being given to the former than 
the latter.40 
1. Onsite and Offsite Proffers ~ “Specifically Attributable” Impacts 
Under subdivision C(i), both “onsite” proffers (i.e., those addressing an 
impact within the boundaries of the property to be developed) and “offsite” 
proffers (i.e., those addressing an impact outside of the property, inclusive of 
any cash proffer) are to be deemed unreasonable unless they address an im-
pact that is “specifically attributable” to the proposed development or use.41 
The term “specifically attributable” is a shortened version of a term of art 
used in the introduced bill “specifically and uniquely attributable.”42 The lat-
ter phrase is borrowed from exaction case law in the courts of other states as 
well as the federal courts and has been understood to connote a higher stand-
ard than the “rough proportionality” standard as it has been developed in ex-
action case law.43 
In contrast to competing standards for evaluating exactions (such as the 
“judicial deference” and “rational nexus” standards), the “specifically and 
uniquely attributable” test applies strict scrutiny when evaluating land use 
regulations.44 This test requires that the imposed exaction be in direct propor-
tion to a specifically created need and thereby limits required exactions to 
those specifically and uniquely attributable to the impact of the develop-
ment.45   
Historically, the phrase “specifically and uniquely attributable” has been 
championed by the Illinois Supreme Court in the context of exaction law and 
other state courts have adopted it. In Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village 
                                                 
40 Id. at § 15.2-2303.4(C). 
41 Id. at § 15.2-2303.4(C)(i). 
42 See S.B. 549, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016). But see, Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2303.4(C) 
(2016). 
43 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389–91. 
44 Daniel W. Russo, Note, Protecting Property Rights with Strict Scrutiny: An Argument for the Specifi-
cally and Uniquely Attributable Standard, 25 Fordham Urb. L.J. 575, 587 (1998). 
45 Id. 
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of Mount Prospect, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that requiring de-
velopers to dedicate land for public use is permissible only if the need for 
such land “is specifically and uniquely attributable to [the developer’s] activ-
ity.”46 Otherwise, such a requirement “is forbidden and amounts to a confis-
cation of private property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions 
rather than reasonable regulation under the police power.”47   
The Court continued, “[u]nder this standard, if the local government can-
not demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the specifically 
created need, ‘the exaction becomes a veiled exercise of the power of eminent 
domain and a confiscation of private property behind the defense of police 
regulations.’”48 
In Northern Illinois Homebuilders Assn. v. County of DuPage, Illinois ap-
plied the “specifically and uniquely attributable” standard to the imposition 
of “transportation impact fees.”49 There, the court approved of a statute that 
incorporated the following definition: 
“Specifically and uniquely attributable” means that a new development creates 
the need, or an identifiable portion of the need, for additional capacity to be pro-
vided by a road improvement. Each new development paying impact fees used 
to fund a road improvement must receive a direct and material benefit from the 
road improvement constructed with the impact fees paid. The need for road im-
provements funded by impact fees shall be based upon generally accepted traffic 
engineering practices as assignable to the new development paying the fees.50 
The Illinois Supreme Court approved of this language, observing that it 
“comports with the [requirement]…that an exaction which required a devel-
oper to provide for improvements ‘which are required by [his] activity,’ 
would be permissible, but one which required him to provide for improve-
ments made necessary by ‘the total activity of the community,’ would be for-
bidden.”51   
Several states have followed Illinois’s lead in adopting the “specifically 
and uniquely attributable” standard. For example, in adopting the “specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable” standard in 1975, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court observed “that there has been a disregard of the fundamental principle 
prohibiting discrimination in cost apportionment in requiring [a developer] 
                                                 
46 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961). 
47 Id. 
48 N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n, Inc. v. Cty. of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ill. 1995) (quoting Dolan, 
512 U.S. at 389-90). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 389–90 (quoting 605 ILCS 5/5–903 (West 1992)). 
51 Id. at 390 (citing Pioneer Trust, 176 N.E.2d at 799). 
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to pay $20,000 and allocating no part of the cost to the other properties alleg-
edly specially benefited by improvement, which was constructed as a general 
improvement.”52   
Although the modified phrase “specifically attributable” used in subsec-
tion C of the Act has not been particularly discussed in case law, its import 
and impact is likely similar to the source phrase – namely that, to be reason-
able, a proffer subject to the Act must address a need that was created, at least 
in part, by the rezoning or PCA (although the rezoning or PCA need not be 
the sole cause of the need, as it may have been under the original language). 
2. Offsite Proffers ~ Additional Limitations 
As noted supra, the roots of the proffer system dealt effectively with onsite 
issues such as setbacks, buffers, and limitations on density. In many respects, 
it has been the marked expansion in the use of offsite proffers (including cash 
proffers) that has generated (over) reliance on proffers by localities to sup-
plement resources generated by the general population and encouraged abuse 
of the system. As such, the Act establishes additional protections specific to 
offsite proffers in subdivision C(ii).53 
Under subdivision C(ii), an offsite proffer is to be deemed unreasonable 
pursuant to the first subdivision (i.e., deemed not to be “specifically attribut-
able”) unless it addresses an impact to an offsite public facility such that (a) 
the new development or use creates the need, or a portion of the need, for a 
public facility improvement in excess of existing capacity and (b) each new 
development or use receives a direct and material benefit from the public 
facility improvement resulting from the proffer.54 As noted previously, public 
facility improvements are defined in subdivision A to consist of offsite public 
transportation improvements, public safety facility improvements, public 
school facility improvements, and public parks.55 
Thus, under subdivision C(ii), the Act makes clear that offsite proffers (in-
clusive of cash) must go to a limited universe of public facility improvements 
the need for which is created by the development or use and that each such 
improvement must enjoy a benefit therefrom in order to satisfy the “specifi-
cally attributable” requirement in subdivision C(i). Importantly, the “test” for 
satisfying C(ii) directly replicates the “specifically and uniquely attributable” 
test used by the Illinois Supreme Court in Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank 
                                                 
52 Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Wayne, 334 A.2d 30, 41 (N.J. 1975). 
53 Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2303.4(C)(ii) (2012). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at § 15.2-2303.4(A). 
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such that offsite proffers must arguably meet that standard and case law in-
terpreting that standard will likely be relevant to Virginia courts interpreting 
the meaning of subdivision C(ii). 
The last sentence of subsection C provides that in calculating public facil-
ity “capacity” for purposes of subdivision C(ii), the locality utilize “projected 
impacts” specifically attributable to the new development or use. Thus, the 
locality is not limited to the immediate impact but may project the impact 
into the future. 
D. Enforcement Provisions 
Subsection D consists of various provisions designed to allow an applicant 
or landowner of a subject property to enforce the provisions of the Act and 
enjoy a remedy in the case of violation by a locality.56 
Subdivision D(1) limits the universe of contestants in a cause of action to 
enforce the provisions of the Act to either an aggrieved applicant or the owner 
of the relevant property (in the event those are different parties) and requires 
that any such action be brought within thirty days of the offensive locality 
action (e.g., either adopting or failing to adopt a rezoning or PCA in violation 
of the Act).57 
Subdivision D(2) provides a presumption available to certain ag-
grieved/applicant landowners in the case of a denial of a rezoning or PCA in 
violation of subdivision B(ii) of the Act (contra the impermissible request/ac-
ceptance of an unreasonable proffer pursuant to B(i)).58 Specifically, the sub-
division provides that in the case of a denial (the B(ii) situation) where an 
applicant/owner is able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it 
either refused or failed to submit an unreasonable proffer or PCA that was 
suggested, requested, or required by the locality, the court is to “presume, 
absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, that such refusal or fail-
ure was the controlling basis for the denial.”59   
Pursuant to its plain terms, subdivision D(2) seeks to avoid the situation in 
which (i) the locality does, in fact, suggest/request/etc. an unreasonable prof-
fer, (ii) the applicant declines to offer the requested unreasonable proffer, (iii) 
the locality denies the rezoning, but (iv) attributes the denial to some other 
factor (e.g., health, safety, welfare).60 In such a situation, if the applicant/land-
                                                 
56 Id. at § 15.2-2303.4(D). 
57 Va. Code Ann. §§ 15.2-2285(F), 15.2-2303.4(D)(1) (2016). 
58 Id. at § 15.2-2303.4(D)(2). 
59 Id. 
60 See, e.g., Gregory v. Bd. of Supervisors of Chesterfield Cty., 257 Va. 530 (1999). 
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owner is able to make the threshold showing, she is entitled to a strong pre-
sumption that her refusal to submit the unreasonable proffer was the proxi-
mate cause for the denial. Such a presumption is likely to be critical to the 
successful prosecution of a case pursuant to the Act. 
Subdivision D(3) is a fee shifting provision that provides an appli-
cant/owner who is successful in contesting the actions of a locality in viola-
tion of the Act with attorney fees and costs along with an order remanding 
the rezoning or PCA to the local governing body with a direction to approve 
the rezoning or PCA without the offensive proffer. This provision should 
function as a significant deterrent to violations of the Act by localities. 
E. Certain Exemptions 
Subdivision E provides exemptions from the statute for certain high 
growth, high density areas (mostly in Northern Virginia).61 For areas meeting 
the descriptions, proffers for new development or use that would otherwise 
be governed by the Act are subject only to existing limitations.  
F. Second Enactment Clause: Impact on Existing Provisions 
 The Second Enactment Clause is intended to provide guidance to 
courts analyzing the interplay between the Act and existing statutes govern-
ing proffers. Specifically, the clause makes clear that the Act is supplemental 
to all existing statutory provisions governing proffers that are consistent with 
its terms but trumps any existing statute that conflicts with its terms as to the 
subset of proffers (i.e., proffers offered in the context of residential rezon-
ings/PCA’s) impacted by the Act.62   
 While it is likely that a court would have reached this conclusion 
based on fundamental rules of statutory construction, the clause is designed 
to eliminate any doubt in that regard. 
G. Third Enactment Clause: Prospective Application 
 The Third Enactment Clause makes clear that the Act only impacts 
rezoning applications filed on or after July 1, 2016, (the effective date of the 
Act) and PCA applications filed after that date amending proffers on a rezon-
ing filed after that date. The apparent purpose of this provision is to give 
localities and applicants the time to adjust to the new regime and to make 
clear that the new Act may not be used to undo proffers agreed to prior to its 
                                                 
61 Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2303.4(E) (2016). 
62 2016 Va. Acts 322. 
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effective date.63 
CONCLUSION 
Virginia’s system of conditional zoning was predicated on a desire to al-
low developers and local governments to enter voluntary yet legally binding 
agreements regarding conditions to be placed on land in addition to, or as 
modification of, the regulations provided for in a particular zoning district in 
to placate any concerns of the community in order to smooth the way for a 
rezoning approval. Over its history, the system has run fairly far afield – with 
developers routinely proffering (voluntarily in name only) to provide cash, 
services, and other things of value to the locality the connection of which to 
the actual impact of the project is tenuous at best. While the Proffer Reform 
Act will not (and cannot) address all questionable circumstances, its provi-
sions should provide new rights to applicants while allowing them to pay a 
fair share for the impacts of a development and, thereby, pull the proffer sys-
tem back in the direction of its roots. 
  
                                                 
63 Id. 
17
Mullen and Banzhaf: Virginia's Proffer System and the Proffer Reform Act of 2016
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017
Do Not Delete 4/28/2017  10:17 AM 
220 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XX:iii 
 
18
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 3
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol20/iss3/3
